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2Abstract: 
 
Recusal has been present in one form or another in most 
civilized societies dating back to the sixteenth century. Today, 
recusal law finds its place in American jurisprudence at §§ 144 
& 455. The scarce case law and lack of scholarly attention given 
to recusal perpetuates its aura of ambiguity and makes 
application of recusal standards to real factual situations 
difficult. When D.C. Circuit judge John Roberts interviewed with 
high White House officials seven days prior to hearing Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld—a case where President Bush was a defendant and also 
the personal designator of Salim Hamdan as an enemy combatant—
the contemporaneous events seemed to place the future Chief 
Justice in the scope of the § 455(a) recusal standard. An in 
depth look into other controversial § 455(a) situations, which 
involved high profile justices, will evince the need for recusal 
reform. After careful consideration of several scholars’ recusal 
reform proposals, this Comment recommends the formation of an 
independent oversight committee composed entirely of retired 
federal judges.         
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4I. Introduction 
 In the last six months, the Supreme Court has seen two new 
members join the bench. During both confirmation hearings, each 
candidate answered hundreds of questions, which many times were 
tough-minded—-causing the Justice to sidestep an answer or give 
an unsatisfactory response to an inquisitive Senator.1
Additionally, the newly appointed Justices were both grilled on 
questions of recusal;2 an area of law that maintains an aura of 
ambiguity and vagueness.3 While the media did not hone in on the 
recusal issues presented during the confirmation hearings, this 
Comment will illuminate the importance of recusal by analyzing a 
controversial situation that involved Chief Justice Roberts.4
Public confidence in judicial fairness and impartiality 
legitimizes the American government.5 In the Federalist Papers, 
Alexander Hamilton states the importance that life tenure and a 
permanent salary have in allowing the judicial branch to act 
impartial, an especially important attribute as “the weakest of 
the three departments of power.”6 The Constitution requires that 
Federal judges are appointed as a result of their fair-
mindedness, impartiality, and unbiased nature;7 however, no 
appointed judge decides the merits of a case with a tabula rasa.8
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, bias or prejudice towards a 
party is the prerequisite for a judge9 to recuse10 himself from 
hearing a case.11 
5The history of recusal in American jurisprudence finds its 
primary focus in the twentieth century, yet it dates back to as 
early as the eighteenth century.12 This Comment begins with an 
introduction to the history of recusal through legislative 
change, scandal, benchmark decisions, and American Bar 
Association recommendations. Next, a background discussion of 
the main case Hamdan v. Rumsfeld will detail a situation where 
recusal became an issue. Following the introduction of recusal 
and Hamdan, this Comment will compare Justice Roberts’ situation 
in Hamdan to other highly publicized recusal episodes. 
Subsequent to the recusal case analysis, this Comment will 
investigate leading scholars’ suggestions to improve recusal 
law, which will be followed by an oversight committee proposal. 
Finally, this Comment will conclude with a summary of the 
arguments laid out in the analysis and predict the implications 
of changing the recusal process. 
 
II. Background 
 The standard that a judge should act impartial in deciding 
the outcome of an adversarial meeting dates back to ancient 
times.13 In American jurisprudence, however, the significant 
changes to recusal law and its application to federal judges 
gained prominence in the early twentieth century.14 The first 
recusal statute was passed by Congress in 1792.15 In 1821, 
6Congress broadened the 1792 statute by amending it to require 
district court judges to recuse themselves when either litigant 
was related or connected to the judge.16 Congress added a second 
recusal statute in 1911—-because of public criticism of the 
judiciary17--which allowed a party to file an affidavit to 
disqualify a district court judge who displayed general bias or 
prejudice.18 The Congress codified both the first and second 
recusal statutes in 1948. The former recusal statute is present 
day 28 U.S.C. § 455, while the latter is present day 28 U.S.C. § 
144.19 Additionally, the 1948 amendments changed the recusal 
statutes from “for cause”20 provisions to self-enforcing 
provisions that required judges to decide whether they should be 
disqualified for impartiality.21 
The 1970’s brought significant controversy to the judicial 
branch that prompted reform by the American Bar Association 
(hereinafter “ABA”) and Congress. In 1968, the confirmation 
hearings of Justice Fortas revealed that he consulted the White 
House on important matters including the Detroit riots of 1967.22 
A Supreme Court Justice consulting the White House on important 
domestic issues violated separation of powers and resulted in 
public distrust of the federal courts.23 The Judicial branch 
suffered a second black eye when Judge Clement Haynsworth Jr. 
failed to be confirmed to the Supreme Court on account of his 
lapses in ethical judgment.24 
7Swift action was needed to “resuscitate” the ethical 
standards of the federal judiciary and the ABA stepped up to the 
challenge. In 1969, a group of renowned legal leaders headed by 
Roger J. Traynor commenced meeting to reform the judicial 
standards.25 The ABA’s House of Delegates26 unanimously voted in 
favor of the Traynor committee changes to the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.27 Most notably, the committee stressed the importance of 
an appearance standard, a tougher guideline that helped judges 
determine when recusal was appropriate.28 Furthermore, in April 
1973, the U.S. Judicial Conference29 adopted a similar, but more 
stringent form of the ABA’s Code.30 These legal governing bodies 
set the stage for Congress to enact new standards of their own. 
 Congress knew the time was right to amend the judicial 
disqualification statutes—-as a result of the change in judicial 
standards by the ABA and U.S. Judicial Conference, the 
Haynsworth pecuniary improprieties, the Fortas separation of 
powers controversy, and the Rehnquist conflict of interest 
situation31—-and enacted legislation that ameliorated many of the 
deficiencies of § 455.32 The Senate and House Judiciary 
Committees submitted detailed reports prior to amending § 455.33 
Both Reports explained the underlying reasons behind the changes 
made to the recusal statute; however, this Comment will solely 
refer to the House Report because it includes more commentary 
and was published a year later.34 
8Congress wanted to synthesize the ABA’s Code of Judicial 
Ethics with § 455 because a dual standard, ethical and 
statutory, existed that confused judges when deciding whether 
recusal was appropriate.35 Congress also placed great importance 
on the Judicial Conference applying the new disqualification 
Canon36 to all federal judges.37 Most importantly, Congress 
replaced the subjective standard—-“in his opinion” with an 
objective standard “his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned”—-to renew public confidence in the judicial 
process.38 Since the 1970’s, neither § 455 nor § 144 have 
undergone significant statutory language change. In spite of the 
stagnant congressional action, modern court cases have led to 
important growth in the interpretation of recusal. 
 Historically, Congress and the ABA shaped recusal law, 
however, a few cases played a significant role in the early 
development of recusal principles because their rulings 
publicized the enforcement gaps in the recusal process.39 Aside 
from Laird v. Tatum,40 few cases made noteworthy changes to 
recusal law until the 1980’s. In 1988, Liljeberg v. Health 
Services Acquisition Corp.41 affirmed the importance of the 
statutory recusal law changes of the 1970’s when the Supreme 
Court applied the objective standard42 to recusal in order to 
preserve public confidence in the judicial process.43 
Additionally, Liljeberg clarified the retroactive status of § 
9455, which is critical to the effectiveness of the recusal 
statute.44 Liteky v. United States45 provided the next momentous 
change in recusal law because the decision explained the oft 
misinterpreted extrajudicial source rule.46 In Cheney v. United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia,47 the media 
highlighted the problems inherent in the recusal standards; the 
issue of whether Justice Scalia would recuse himself from 
hearing the case became such a public spectacle48 that he 
released a memorandum explaining in detail why recusal was 
inappropriate.49 
The history of recusal viewed through legislative change, 
ABA recommendations, scandal, and benchmark decisions, verifies 
the complicated nature of determining whether disqualification 
is necessary; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld provides the ideal setting for 
scrutinizing recusal standards. As Justice Jackson poetically 
put it, “The opinions of judges, no less than executives and 
publicists, often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of 
a power's validity with the cause it is invoked to promote, of 
confounding the permanent executive office with its temporary 
occupant.”50 Hamdan places the court in a position to shape the 
scope of presidential powers, which layman and the media, seem 
to question more and more;51 the appearance of an Executive 
juggernaut who selects Justices that he believes will not oppose 
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his legislation reinforces why the Roberts’ situation should be 
closely examined.     
Judge John Roberts was one of three judges who presided 
over the controversial Hamdan.52 A two-tier analysis of Hamdan
reveals the significance of the case to both recusal law and the 
war on terror. The first tier deals with the allegations that 
Justice Roberts should have recused himself from hearing Hamdan
because he was contemporaneously interviewing with top White 
House officials.53 The second tier examines the high stakes 
involved in the administration’s war on terror, which could sink 
or swim depending on Hamdan’s outcome.54 
A. An Appearance of Impropriety? 
Judge Roberts met with Attorney General Alberto Gonzales on 
April 1, six days before Hamdan’s oral arguments.55 Additionally, 
Roberts met with other high White House officials on May 3.56 The 
job-clinching interview between President Bush and Judge Roberts 
took place on July 15, the same day Roberts joined the Hamdan
decision.57 No public knowledge of the meetings existed until 
Judge Roberts filled out a questionnaire for the Senate 
Judiciary Committee prior to the confirmation process;58 the 
attorney who represented Salim Hamdan also lacked awareness of 
the meetings.59 
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B. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
Salim Ahmed Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan during 
hostilities in that country that resulted from the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.60 After Hamdan’s capture, the 
United States military transferred him to the Guantanamo Bay 
detention facility.61 On July 3, 2003, President Bush designated 
Hamdan for trial by military commission because it was believed 
Hamdan was a member of al Qaeda or involved in terrorism against 
the United States.62 
In the first Hamdan trial, the District Court concluded 
that a competent tribunal never determined whether Hamdan was 
entitled to prisoner of war (“POW”) status under the Geneva 
Conventions.63 Furthermore, until a competent tribunal determined 
Hamdan’s status, he could only be tried by court-martial under 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).64 Next, the court 
found that the Military Commissions’ rules of procedure were 
inconsistent with a court-martial convened under the UCMJ, 
making them unlawful.65 Last, the court inferred that the 
creation of the military commissions by the President broadened 
the executive powers inherent in the Constitution.66 
On appeal, the government prevailed over Hamdan. The 
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia concluded that no 
separation of powers issue existed because Congress authorized 
the President to create the Military Commission that was to try 
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Hamdan.67 The circuit court determined that the 1949 Geneva 
Convention did not apply to Hamdan,68 and even if it did, Hamdan 
could not enforce the Convention provisions in court.69 
Therefore, the President’s determination70 that Hamdan was a 
member of al-Qaeda nullified the jurisdictional issue, which 
allowed the Military Commission71 to try Hamdan rather than the 
court-martial under the UCMJ.72 
The myriad issues present in the Hamdan proceedings evince 
the complex nature of the legal arguments raised by both sides.73 
The background information discussed the major issues found in 
both the original trial and appeal; however, the forthcoming 
analysis will primarily concentrate on the separation of powers 
issue because this issue gives the Roberts’ situation 
distinction.74 
III. Analysis 
A. Recusal in a Nutshell 
A look at the big picture clarifies the situation. First, 
an objective observer—-the threshold of interpreting the §455(a) 
appearance standard75—-could conclude that Judge Roberts’ chances 
of nomination would decrease if he took an unfavorable position 
on the administrations use of Military Commissions. Second, 
Salim Hamdan brought a separation of powers claim76 against the 
President for establishing the Military Commissions and 
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President Bush was a defendant in the case77—-both very serious 
issues. Third, Judge Roberts never informed the public or 
Hamdan’s counsel of the interviews.78 Fourth, unlike the Supreme 
Court, the appeals court may rotate in a different judge if one 
of the initial judges recuse.79 Fifth, the same day the Circuit 
Court released the Hamdan decision in favor of the Bush 
Administration, Roberts and President Bush had an interview.80 An
application of the previously mentioned facts to section 455(a)-
-“Any justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge] of the 
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in 
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned”81--
suggests “questions of impartiality”, requiring Judge Roberts’ 
recusal. 
Justice Stevens delivered the preeminent § 455(a) decision 
in Liljeberg, stating that “advancement of the purpose of the 
provision – to promote public confidence in the integrity of the 
judicial process – does not depend upon whether or not the judge 
actually knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so 
long as the public might reasonably believe that he or she 
knew.”82 Stevens’ opinion reiterated the congressional intent of 
§ 455—-err on the side of caution when the appearance of bias is 
present.83 
Did Judge Roberts err on the side of caution? High White 
House officials84 interviewing Judge Roberts as a possible 
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Supreme Court nominee was completely ethical; in fact, the ABA’s 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct approves of interviewing 
potential appointment nominees.85 However, the ethical dilemma 
exists because of the timing of the interviews in relation to 
the Hamdan trial proceeding and the heavy involvement by 
President Bush—-designating Hamdan as an enemy combatant and 
being the primary defendant in the trial.   
The April 1 interview with Attorney General Gonzalez 
clearly indicated the administration considered Judge Roberts as 
one of the top candidates to fill a Supreme Court vacancy.86 Six 
days later, Roberts heard the oral arguments in the Hamdan
appeal87--a trial where the administration’s war on terror 
policies were seriously questioned.88 No one will ever know 
whether Roberts joined the opinion because he realized a 
possible Supreme Court nomination loomed in the near future, but 
the enormity—-the administrations use of Military Commissions to 
try alleged terrorists89--of the Hamdan decision certainly raises 
ethical questions.90 
B. High Profile Cases Where a Recusal Controversy was Present:  
 The Roberts’ recusal controversy is most easily understood 
when placed in the context of other highly debated court cases. 
In the next two sections, this Comment will discuss two Supreme 
Court cases where a Justice’s appearance of impropriety was 
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questioned. Additionally, in both cases the Supreme Court 
decided significant Constitutional decisions,91 which depending 
on the outcome, would create noteworthy change throughout our 
country. Each case analysis will begin with background 
information, followed by an introduction of the recual 
controversy, and end with a comparison of the case’s situation 
to Roberts’ situation.     
i. The Duck Hunt 
Following the 1974 statutory change to recusal law, the 
Supreme Court avoided controversies stemming from these changes 
for a lengthy period of time. The highest court’s luck ran out92 
when Justice Scalia went on a duck-hunting trip with Vice 
President Dick Cheney while Cheney v. United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia was pending before the 
Supreme Court.93 Cheney involved an energy group--created by 
President Bush and chaired by Vice President Cheney--whose 
primary goal was to institute a national energy policy.94 The 
Sierra Club95 alleged that the energy group violated the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”) because the group never publicly 
disclosed information from their meetings, yet, non-government 
individuals fully participated in the closed door meetings as de 
facto members.96 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Vice 
President Cheney.97 
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The news coverage of the duck-hunting trip shadowed the 
Supreme Court decision.98 Prior to the oral arguments, countless 
news sources raised ethical questions regarding the legality of 
Justice Scalia engaging in personal activities with a future 
defendant.99 As a result of the media coverage the Sierra Club 
filed a motion to recuse Justice Scalia.100 The months of 
speculative improprieties waned on the associate justice, and on 
March 18, 2004, Justice Scalia released a memorandum vehemently 
denying any and all suggestions that he should recuse himself 
from Cheney.101 In fairness to Justice Scalia, the memorandum 
clarified the facts in such a manner that it appeared Vice 
President Cheney and Justice Scalia never discussed the case.102 
The significance of this memorandum is that it essentially 
quashed the argument that Justice Scalia’s personal and 
professional worlds were forming a nexus of impropriety—-which 
would have violated the appearance standard of § 455(a). Some 
scholars believe that drafting memoranda when questions of 
recusal are present would solve much of the public skepticism 
aimed at the recusal process.103 
Scalia’s memorandum had quickly written off the Sierra 
Club’s allegations because their motion based the majority of 
its argument on newspaper articles—-misstating the facts--rather 
than pure legal arguments.104 Contrary to his usual flawless 
rhetoric, Justice Scalia misapplied the § 455(a) standard in his 
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memorandum when he stated “The question, simply put, is whether 
someone who thought I could decide this case impartially despite 
my friendship with the Vice President would reasonably believe 
that I cannot decide it impartially because I went hunting with 
a friend.”105 The Justice substituted the tougher standard might
question impartiality with “what a reasonable person believes
about the Justice’s impartiality.”106 Additionally, “[T]he point 
is not that Scalia cannot decide the case impartially, but 
again, that a reasonable person might question whether he can do 
so.”107 When Justice Scalia stretched the language of § 455(a), 
it appeared to implicate him; however, in light of the actual 
facts of the hunting-trip and the regularity that Justices 
personally associate with Executive officials,108 it seems fair 
to give Justice Scalia the benefit of the doubt.109 To the dismay 
of Justice Scalia, his memorandum had little or no effect on his 
critics.110 While the memorandum did little in gaining support, 
it helped the public understand the reasoning behind why a 
Justice decided against recusal,111 which is more than can be 
said for the way Justice Roberts handled Hamdan.112 
In both Cheney and Hamdan, the court decided a separation 
of powers issue involving high profile defendants;113 the recusal 
controversy surrounding both cases involved the § 455(a) 
appearance of impropriety standard.114 Even when taking into 
consideration Scalia’s memorandum, an objective observer could 
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reasonably question both the judge and Justice’s impartiality; 
on the one hand, Roberts had an opportunity to serve for the 
most prestigious court in the free world, and on the other hand, 
Scalia had an opportunity to ensure a lower court did not 
patronize his friend.115 Nevertheless, Scalia defended himself 
against disqualification via the memorandum, which he did not 
even have to do, Roberts did not.116 The Supreme Court had no 
replacement if Justice Scalia recused from Cheney;117 conversely, 
finding a replacement for Judge Roberts at the appeals court 
level presented very little problem.118 Both situations appear to 
fail the § 455(a) standard--“whether his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned”—-because it looks as if both judges 
had a logical reason to favor a litigant. In light of all the 
facts, a litigant’s right to a fair trial suffers the most when 
a Supreme Court Justice recuses himself because he or she can 
not be replaced;119 therefore, Roberts refusal to disqualify 
himself may be perceived as more serious. 
 While Cheney does not help interpret the §455(a) 
impartiality standard, the case publicizes a serious problem 
that our most hallowed courtrooms currently suffer—-judges who 
believe the recusal standard is overly vague,120 and as a 
consequence, ignore the standard. Additionally, the Scalia 
memorandum elucidated the Justice’s interaction with the Vice 
President; a tool, that if utilized more frequently would uphold 
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the purpose of the appearance standard—-to satisfy the public’s 
confidence in an autonomous judiciary.121 Last, the detailed 
account of the Roberts’ recusal controversy compared with 
Scalia’s controversy in Cheney reinforces the lack of teeth the 
recusal standard possesses and buttresses the argument for 
recusal reform. 
 
ii. The Pledge of Allegiance Case 
 Prior to the Cheney episode, Justice Scalia’s first recusal 
controversy involved a First Amendment case which originated in 
the state of California.122 Newdow is similar to both Hamdan and 
Cheney because the appearance standard of § 455(a) ultimately 
guided the Associate Justice to recuse himself.123 Again, Newdow
like Cheney, does not help with the interpretation of the 
appearance standard; however, Newdow provides an example of a 
situation where a Justice must recuse himself from deciding a 
highly contested issue, and furthermore, evinces the need for 
recusal reform due to the unclear standard of § 455(a).   
On January 12, 2003, Justice Scalia spoke at a 
Fredericksburg, Virginia religious freedom event sponsored in 
part by the Knights of Columbus.124 As the main speaker, Scalia 
indicated that the Ninth Circuit decision in Newdow v. United 
States Congress misinterpreted the Establishment Clause.125 As 
history often repeats itself, Justice Scalia’s comments on the 
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merits of Newdow stirred up controversy because the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari nine months after his speech.126 Michael 
Newdow raised a constitutional challenge on behalf of his 
daughter, arguing that recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance 
violates the First Amendment.127 Specifically, Newdow stated that 
the phrase “under God” violates the Establishment clause of the 
First Amendment.128 Prior to the oral arguments before the 
Supreme Court, Michael Newdow filed a motion to recuse Justice 
Scalia based on his January 12 comments.129 Newdow believed that 
Justice Scalia’s comments evidenced that the Justice had already 
decided his position without reading the briefs; a situation 
where an objective person might reasonably question the judge’s 
impartiality.130 Justice Scalia recused,131 but unlike Cheney, no
memorandum explaining the reasoning behind his decision 
accompanied his action. While a legal memorandum is not a 
requirement of recusal, when a judge provides these details--
especially a Supreme Court Justice—-it guides other judges in 
deciding what actions would, and would not, be appropriate to 
justify recusal. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the school 
district, but not on Constitutional grounds;132 the Court found 
that Newdow lacked the requisite standing requirement133 to bring 
a claim on behalf of his daughter.134 
While Scalia deprived the public of an insightful 
memorandum,135 the actions which caused the respondent to 
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question the Justice’s impartiality were legally 
straightforward.136 A Justice commenting on a particular case 
before he hears the arguments implies a prematurely formed 
opinion; an opinion that an objective observer might reasonably 
question would allow the Justice to decide the legal issue 
impartially. Conversely, the facts surrounding the Roberts 
appearance of impropriety do not apply to § 455(a) as easily.137 
Roberts never made a statement explaining his ambition to become 
a Supreme Court Justice or his outward support of the Military 
Commissions. The lack of a public record to this effect 
differentiates Roberts’ situation with Scalia’s. Contrasting 
Newdow with Hamdan helps reinforce the vague appearance standard 
inherent in § 455(a). While the facts in Newdow made its 
application to the appearance standard easier, the lack of a 
memorandum stating the legal reasoning continued the 
misunderstanding of recusal law,138 which is one of the chief 
reasons that Hamdan is so controversial.139 
The magnitude of the potential outcome from the Supreme 
Court decision differed dramatically between Newdow and Hamdan.
No one can deny that the Establishment Clause separating church 
and state is a critical legal issue in American jurisprudence;140 
however, the Supreme Court ended up deciding an issue of 
standing rather than Constitutionality.141 Alternatively, in 
Hamdan, the stakes were exceptionally high for the Bush 
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administration’s war on terror.142 As one of three judges hearing 
Hamdan, Roberts knew that the administration urgently needed the 
Circuit Court to find that the Military Commissions--created by 
President Bush--did not violate the separation of powers 
inherent in the Constitution. Joining the majority opinion in 
full, Roberts’ approval of the Military Commissions to prosecute 
terrorists probably went over well in his interview with 
President Bush later that day.143 In light of the aforementioned 
reasons, it appears entirely rational that an outside observer 
might reasonably question Roberts’ impartiality where President 
Bush was the defendant.144 
Ultimately, the appearance standard145 is the recusal 
statute that would govern both Hamdan and Newdow. Two concepts 
within both situations must be observed to understand their 
connection. First, Scalia’s critical comments of the Ninth 
Circuit Court’s opinion on a legal matter that was granted 
Certiorari, provided a straightforward example of an appearance 
of bias by a Supreme Court Justice;146 whereas, judge Roberts’—-a 
D.C. Circuit Court Judge--apparent bias resulted from a 
communication he had with a future litigant, the Bush 
Administration, which was undoubtedly a more tenuous bias.147 
Both situations present distinguished, high level judges taking 
actions where it would be “reasonable” for his “impartiality” to 
be “questioned.” Second, while legal commentators have 
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established that the Newdow situation was relatively 
straightforward,148 the implications of the Constitutional 
question argued in Newdow does not reach the level of volatility 
that the questions raised in Hamdan reach.149 As explained 
earlier, the high Court did not even decide Newdow on the First 
Amendment issue.150 But, had such an issue been decided, the 
repercussions of that ruling could not have reached the level of 
importance of the separation of powers issues decided by the 
Circuit Court in Hamdan.151 
D. Reforming Recusal—-Winning back the Public Trust 
 An in depth look into Hamdan, Cheney, and Newdow, provides 
some insight into the inexact science of applying recusal law to 
real life situations. In recent years, several scholars have 
devised recusal standards to bring clarity to the law.152 While 
individual aspects of each standard show promise, this Comment 
proposes its own standard, which focuses much of its attention 
on maintaining impartiality to optimize public trust. 
 
i. The Process Oriented Approach 
Legal scholar Amanda Frost takes a comprehensive look at 
the ineffectiveness of the current recusal law and concludes 
that including the legal process components153 in recusal 
procedure would ultimately make recusal more effective and 
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trustworthy.154 The five components include: “litigants, not 
courts, initiate disputes; the disputes are presented through an 
adversarial system in which two or more competing parties give 
their conflicting views; a rationale must be given for 
decisions; decisions must refer to, and be restricted by, an 
identifiable body of law; and the decisionmaker must be 
impartial.”155 Frost proposes that the self-enforcing156 nature 
of § 455 should be amended so that an easily applied procedure 
exists where litigants can seek a judicial disqualification.157 
Additionally, Frost believes that § 455 should be amended so 
that judges are required to disclose all information-—where 
questions of impartiality might arise--directly to the 
litigants, as opposed to only disclosing information upon a 
litigant’s request.158 Next, Frost concludes that the court 
should refer recusal motions to a neutral judge rather than the 
judge in question because this would protect the integrity of 
the judiciary.159 Finally, Frost states that a judge who faces a 
recusal motion should be encouraged to file a statement 
explaining why recusal is not justified;160 if the judge does 
decide to disqualify himself, Frost believes that he or she 
should explain his or her decision for removal to “provide a 
body of precedent to guide judges facing such decisions in the 
future.”161 
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Professor Frost’s reforms certainly could have suppressed 
much of the public clamor that resulted from the Roberts recusal 
situation. If Judge Roberts had disclosed the information 
regarding his interviews with administration officials prior to 
oral arguments, the public and Hamdan’s lawyer would have had 
less reason to suspect any impropriety. Also, if Hamdan’s lawyer 
filed a motion because he was not satisfied with Roberts’ 
disclosure, a neutral judge deciding on the merits of the motion 
along with the supplemented explanation162 by Roberts would 
surely alleviate the appearance of an impropriety. However, the 
Frost standard places a lot of extra responsibility on the judge 
who faces recusal,163 especially since many judges take it
personally when their impartiality is challenged.164 
ii. Increase Recusal Motions Approach 
 Legal scholar Debra Bassett concentrates on applying her 
recusal reform to the Supreme Court, but the standard is just as 
relevant to the lower courts.165 At times, the Bassett standard 
appears to be a carbon copy of the process oriented approach;166 
nevertheless, Bassett chiefly emphasizes disclosure of 
potentially germane information by judges—-increasing the flow 
of information from the judiciary to the public.167 Professor 
Bassett proposes that the self-enforcing standard for 
disqualification should remain,168 but that the court draft a new 
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statement of recusal.169 Bassett believes that “statements of 
interest” will serve as a means to bring transparency to the 
judiciary because the statements will become a public record of 
any and all potential biases.170 As the key component of Basset’s 
reform, “Statements of interest” provide courts with a pragmatic 
solution to an often difficult task—-maintaining efficiency171 
and the perception of flawless integrity.172 
Although the “statements of interest” probably would have 
informed Hamdan’s lawyer and the public about the relationship 
between the Bush administration—-defendants in the case—-and 
Roberts; the former Circuit Court judge inferred that the 
interviews173 did not create an appearance of impropriety because 
Hamdan sued President Bush in his official capacity.174 Contrary 
to the process oriented approach, the lack of a neutral 
decisionmaker deciding whether Roberts appeared impartial, shows 
Bassett’s weakness; as Roberts implied in the Senate 
questioning, no rules had been broken. Therefore, it appears 
that as long as the recusal decision was up to Roberts, he was 
going to hear Hamdan.
E. The Oversight Committee Approach 
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A look into the congressional purpose of § 455(a) reveals 
that the 1974 amendment functioned to “promote public confidence 
in the impartiality of the judicial process.”175 The main 
component of an effective recusal law standard would necessitate 
a completely neutral viewpoint to maintain public confidence.176 
While Professor Bassett’s proposition left 
disqualification solely to the discretion of the judge;177 
Professor Frost stressed the importance of a neutral 
decisionmaker and placed the onus--of determining the 
appropriateness of disqualification--on another judge.178 
However, this Comment proposes that an independent oversight 
committee composed of retired federal judges decide whether the 
recusal motion is justifiable.179 Leaving disqualification to the 
sole discretion of the judge in question does not uphold a high 
enough standard.180 Additionally, many judges find disqualifying 
a fellow colleague too difficult.181 Retired federal judges would 
have a whole career to document their fairness and at this point 
in their lives would certainly not want to tarnish the 
reputation they spent years building.182 
The selection process would involve two branches of the 
government. The President would generate a twenty judge short 
list183 from the pool of retired judges184 and pass the list onto 
the judicial branch. Two Senior Circuit Court judges from each 
of the thirteen circuits would vote on five of the candidates;185 
28 
 
the top five vote grossing retired judges would be appointed to 
the oversight committee.186 However, the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court would have the power to veto one of the appointed 
judges;187 the veto power is necessary because the oversight 
committee would have the authority to recuse Supreme Court 
Justices. Justices would, of course, continue to have the 
ability to recuse themselves, but as the Roberts’ situation 
proves, determining one’s disqualification is not an easy task. 
The oversight committee approach would differ from the 
Frost and Bassett approaches because the committee would be 
capable of eliminating the subconscious biases188-—due to the 
detached nature of the retired judges--present in a judge and 
his colleagues. Unlike § 455(b), which lists specific 
circumstances calling for a judge’s recusal,189 the oversight 
committee would concentrate on deciding disqualification in the 
difficult situations, such as where an appearance of impropriety 
motion is filed. The committee would require the justice in 
question to submit any pertinent information regarding his 
potential for bias. After carefully considering all relevant 
information—-the motion and judge submission--the oversight 
committee will issue a thoughtful opinion determining whether 
recusal is appropriate. While displacing a judge may cause 
contempt towards the committee, over time, the opinions will 
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form a body of recusal law that will help judges understand when 
recusal is, and is not, appropriate.190 
This Comment cannot answer whether the independent 
oversight committee would have disqualified Roberts from Hamdan;
however, the committee would have thoroughly scrutinized whether 
the interviews with the Bush administration could cause the 
public to question Roberts’ impartiality. The sole fact that a 
detached oversight committee is making the decision rather than 
a judge or colleague should suppress any public distrust. While 
nobody doubts Chief Justice Roberts is a man of high integrity, 
the appearance that his loyalty could consciously or 
subconsciously sway his opinion,191 is enough to require an 
oversight committee to make the final decision. 
 The past few years have shown that the Supreme Court is not 
as infallible as once thought.192 In 1993, the high court 
released a statement asserting that the Court would limit the 
coverage of § 455 to its Justices.193 The recent controversies 
indicate that even the most judicious minds in the world may 
have their impartiality questioned. However, allowing the 
independent oversight committee to determine questions of 
impartiality—-for all federal courts--will “promote public 
confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.”194 
Undoubtedly, the application of the oversight committee 
raises questions. Is there a separation of powers issue? The 
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judiciary might argue that the oversight committee takes away 
the independence vested upon their branch by the Constitution; 
nonetheless, this is not a statute dictating how the judiciary 
should rule on law, and the Constitution permits limited 
regulation of the judicial branch.195 The involvement of each 
branch in the implementation of the oversight committee should 
evince Constitutional compliance. Won’t the Commission have too 
many motions to deal with? It is no secret that the federal 
docket is severely backed up,196 however, no one can predict 
whether this would translate into a backed up oversight 
committee. In the beginning, the committee will have their hands 
full, but as more decisions become published and the body of 
recusal law grows, fewer litigants will file motions because the 
recusal standards will provide them guidance. 
 The public wants to believe that the judiciary is an 
impartial actor.197 In the slim chance that a situation of 
impropriety or “an appearance of impropriety” presents itself, 
the public confidence in the judicial branch will remain 
unwavering because a detached oversight committee will see to it 
that justice is preserved. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 The rich history of recusal in American jurisprudence is a 
testament to the importance our Founding Fathers placed on 
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integrity. While most federal judges exemplify honesty, their 
political or personal relationships can sometimes leave others 
with a skewed perception. This Comment covered several 
situations where the impartiality of a judge was questioned; 
sure enough, these situations reinforced the notion that recusal 
law in American jurisprudence remains vague. Certainly, the 
judiciary faces a quandary when applying the current recusal 
standards; in spite of this, several scholars have proposed well 
reasoned reforms that show promise. The oversight committee 
approach recommended by this Comment combines the most rational 
components of the scholarly suggestions with the most 
perceptible gaps in recusal law. Chief Justice Roberts got 
appointed to the Supreme Court for his accolades, not for his 
bias. But, an objective observer could have questioned his 
impartiality based on the timing of the interviews with the 
trial proceedings, which clearly violates § 455(a). The 
oversight committee would have quashed the Hamdan controversy 
while creating important guidelines for future judges and 
litigants to follow. Just how clear-cut was Roberts’ opinion not 
to disqualify himself? The Supreme Court granted Hamdan
certiorari on November 7, 2005, and Chief Justice Roberts 
recused himself from that decision.198 
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the House of Delegates. 
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which required a judge to hear a case until a litigant provided 
unambiguous evidence proving his bias—-and adopted the 
“appearance of propriety” doctrine that required recusal upon 
any appearance of impropriety).   
31 See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (mem.) 
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47 541 U.S. 913 (2004). 
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51 See Jim VandeHei, Bush Reasserts Presidential 
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the question and answer portion of the confirmation hearings 
where Senator Feingold asked judge Roberts about possible 
ethical violations that resulted from the contemporaneous timing 
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54 Compare Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 37-38 (2005) 
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powers inherent in the Constitution when he established military 
commissions” and procedures for the military commissions because 
Congress authorized the President to do so), with Brief for 
Amici Curiae of Fifteen Law Professors in Support of Petitioner-
Appellee and Urging Affirmance at 3, Salim Ahmed Hamdan v. 
Donald H. Rumsfeld, No. 04-5393 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2005) (“The 
President’s Military Order and the regulations implementing it 
seek to combine the powers of the Executive with that of the 
Judiciary. It seeks to unite in the Executive the powers of the 
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panel, sentencing authority, and, in some cases, executioner.”), 
and Emily Bazelon, Thank You, Mr. President, Slate, July 26, 
2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/2123055/ (stating that judge 
Roberts’ vote as one of three panel members on the D.C. Circuit 
provided the Bush Administration overreaching Constitutional 
authority and the power to try suspected terrorists in military 
tribunals, which lack many due-process protections ).        
55 Hearing, supra note 53, at 3 (testimony of Judge John 
Roberts).  
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Bravin, supra note 4, at A4.  
59 Id.
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60 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 
2004).   
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See Id. at 162 (“There is nothing in this record to 
suggest that a competent tribunal has determined that Hamdan is 
not a prisoner-of-war under the Geneva Conventions. Hamdan has 
appeared before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, but the 
CSRT was not established to address detainees’ status under the 
Geneva Conventions . . . . The government’s legal position is 
that the CSRT determination that Hamdan was a member of or 
affiliated with al Qaeda is also determinative of Hamdan’s 
prisoner-of-war status, since the President has already 
determined that detained al Qaeda members are not prisoners-of-
war under the Geneva Conventions. The President is not a 
‘tribunal,’ however.”). 
64 See Id. at 165 (stating that due to the uncertain nature 
of Hamdan’s status as a POW under the Third Geneva Convention he 
may not be tried for war crimes except by a court-martial 
convened under the Uniform Code of Military Justice; the 
military commissions established by the U.S. provide a defendant 
less rights, which is inconsistent with the Third Geneva 
Convention).  
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65 See Id. at 172 (“I cannot stretch the meaning of the 
Military Commission’s rule enough to find it consistent with the 
UCMJ’s right to be present. 10 U.S.C. § 839. A provision that 
permits the exclusion of the accused from his trial . . . . is 
indeed directly contrary to the UCMJ’s right to be present. I 
must accordingly find on the basis of the statue that, so long 
as it operates under such a rule, the Military Commission cannot 
try Hamdan.”). 
66 See Id. at 158-60 (“The major premise of the government’s 
argument that the President has untrammeled power to establish 
military tribunals is that his authority emanates from Article 
II of the Constitution and is inherent in his role as commander-
in-chief. None of the principal cases on which the government 
relies, has so held . . . . Were the President to act outside 
the limits now set for military commissions by Article 21,
however, his actions would fall into the most restricted 
category of cases . . . . [I]n which “the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress.”). 
67 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (explaining that the President did not violate the 
separation of powers inherent in the Constitution because four 
sources of authority allowed him to create the military 
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commissions to try terrorists, especially the Congress’s joint 
resolution “to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided” the attacks and recognized the 
President’s “authority under the Constitution to take action to 
deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the 
United States.” (quoting Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001))).  
68 Id. at 40-42 (explaining that the Convention neither 
applies to al Qaeda--“al Qaeda is not a state and it was not a 
“high Contracting Party”--nor Hamdan--“he does not fit the 
Article 4 definition of a “prisoner of war” entitled to the 
protection of the Convention”--and the President’s determination 
of how these terrorists will be defined in terms of the Geneva 
Convention is entitled deference).   
69 See Id. at 38-40 (explaining that precedent—Johnson v. 
Eisentrager—clearly demonstrates the Geneva Conventions are not 
judicially enforceable because “the convention specifies rights 
of prisoners of war, but “responsibility for observance and 
enforcement of these rights is upon political and military 
authorities.”  (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 
(1950))). 
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President Bush--as a political and military authority--
determined that Hamdan was not a prisoner of war. 
70 Press Release, Dep’t of Defense, President Determines 
Enemy Combatants Subject to His Military Order (July 3, 2003), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20030703-0173.html.
71 See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 42 (stating that the court 
rejected Hamdan’s argument--that the Military Commission 
procedures violate human rights under Common Article 3(1)(d)—-
because his focus was on how the commission may try him rather 
than whether the commission had jurisdiction).    
72 Prisoner of war status under Geneva would have given 
jurisdiction to a court-martial proceeding.   
73 Hamdan raises enough challenging legal questions to write 
a separate comment, however, recusal is the focus of this 
comment. 
74 The number of judges who have recused themselves in 
American legal history is so great that this Comment could not 
begin to determine those figures. The Roberts confirmation 
presents such a unique circumstance because of the high stakes 
involved to both the former Circuit judge and our current 
Administration. While many judges have requested to sit down 
from the bench when the facts seem to merely hint at 
impropriety; Chief Justice Roberts decided to not err on the 
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side of caution—-an action which both the 1974 Congressional 
hearings and the few important Supreme Court recual decisions 
specifically address.  
75 See Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 
1985) (explaining that the test for the appearance standard is 
“whether an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of 
the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought 
would entertain a significant doubt that justice would be done 
in the case.”).  
76 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 37 (2005) (“The 
argument is that Article I, § 8, of the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to constitute Tribunals inferior to the 
Supreme Court, that Congress has not established military 
commission, and that the President has no inherent authority to 
do so under Article II.”).  
77 See Gillers, et al. supra note 52 (“President Bush was a 
defendant in the case because he had personally, in writing, 
found "reason to believe" that Hamdan was a terrorist subject to 
military tribunals.”).  
78 See Bravin, supra note 4, at A4 (explaining that as a 
result of the disclosure of the Roberts’ questionnaire to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, many legal ethicists believe that 
Roberts should have at least notified the defendant’s lawyer, 
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Cmdr. Swift, of his dealings with the White House so the lawyer 
had the opportunity to consider a recusal motion). 
79 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (2004) 
(mem.) (Scalia, J.) (“Let me respond, at the outset, to Sierra 
Club’s suggestion that I should “resolve any doubts in favor of 
recusal.” That might be sound advice if I were sitting on a 
Court of Appeals. There, my place would be taken by another 
judge, and the case would proceed normally.”); see also
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000) 
(“Finally, it is important to note the negative impact that the 
unnecessary disqualification of even one Justice may have upon 
our Court. Here -- unlike the situation in a District Court or a 
Court of Appeals -- there is no way to replace a recused 
Justice.”); Debra Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56
Hastings L.J. 657, 693 n.151 (2005) (explaining that Federal 
circuit courts decide cases in panels of three, unless the judge 
recuses or is disqualified, in which case another appellate 
judge may hear the case (citing 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2000))).  
Judge Roberts knew that if he recused from Hamdan a
qualified federal judge would take his place and the court would 
not “miss a beat.” 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2000). 
80 Bravin, supra note 4, at A4.  
81 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000). 
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82 Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 
847, 859-60 (1988).   
83 See Federal Judicial Center, Analysis of Case Law Under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, 16 (2002) (noting that the First, Fifth, 
Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have stated that on close 
questions of recusal, the judge should decide in favor of 
stepping down); see generally H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355 (explaining that if 
there is a factual basis that makes it appear as though the 
judge may not be impartial he should stand down from hearing the 
case).  
84 Gillers, et al. supra note 52, (explaining that-—prior to 
and throughout the Hamdan legal proceeding—-judge Roberts was 
interviewing with top White House officials without disclosing 
this information to anyone).  
85 See Annotated Model Code of Judicial Conduct Cannon 
5B(2)(a) (2004) (explaining that a potential candidate or judge 
may have communications with any selection or nominating 
commission designated to screen candidates). 
86 Gillers, et al. supra note 52 (stating that Chief Justice  
Rehnquist was expected to retire, not Justice O’Connor). 
87 See generally Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 
461 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing a situation that is similar to 
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Roberts’ talks with White House officials, but may be considered 
more offensive because it deals with negotiations for future 
employment; “we think recusal is required when, at the very time 
a case is about to go to trial before a judge, he is in 
negotiation -- albeit preliminary, tentative, indirect, 
unintentional, and ultimately unsuccessful -- with a lawyer or 
law firm or party in the case over his future employment.”).  
88 See generally Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, 
http://www.sctnomination.com/blog/archives/2005/07/analysis_john
_r_1.html (July 25, 2005, 07:29 AM) (“When Judge Roberts appears 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee reviewing his nomination 
to the Supreme Court, his views on separation of powers issues – 
and on presidential authority, specifically – are sure to be 
probed at length . . . .  [T]he Hamdan opinion reveals a 
substantial degree of judicial deference by Roberts to 
presidential power.”). 
66 See Michael C. Dorf, “The Nation’s Second-Highest Court” 
Upholds Military Commissions, Find Law’s Legal Commentary, July 
20, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20050720.html
(stating that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
extended the Bush Administration’s Executive power; “[i]f the 
D.C. Circuit did not exactly give the President a blank check, 
it certainly extended him a very large line of credit.”).   
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90 Legal scholar Ronald Rotunda argues that if Federal 
Judges recuse themselves from hearing cases where the Federal 
Government is a litigant—-once they find out they are in 
consideration of an appointment to the high court—-several court 
dockets would need to be shuffled to make such accommodations, 
which would burden an already encumbered area of American 
jurisprudence. Memorandum from Ronald D. Rotunda, Professor, 
George Mason University, to Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, at 9 (Aug. 22, 2005) (on file with Roberts 
hearings). This Comment avoids the problem Rotunda suggests 
would have accompanied a recusal by judge Roberts as a result of 
the government being a litigant: President Bush was a defendant 
in Hamdan and his personal involvement in deciding that Salim 
Hamdan was an enemy combatant makes him a direct defendant; 
however, the majority of cases where the Federal Government is a 
litigant and Executive officials are not being sued directly, 
the Solicitor General is the defendant—we will call this one-
step removed. The United States Department of Justice, Office of 
the Solicitor General, Functions of the Office,
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/aboutosg/function.html, (2006). 
Therefore, Rotunda’s argument that several judges in contention 
for a high court nomination will have to recuse themselves from 
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hearing cases that involve the government only holds true when 
an Executive Official is directly involved.      
91 In Cheney v. United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, the Supreme Court determined that the 
District Court’s orders to allow extremely broad discovery, 
impaired the functioning of the Executive branch. This 
separation of powers issue was significant enough for the high 
court to overturn the appellate court and disallow the broad 
discovery. In Newdow v. United States Congress, the petitioner 
believed that recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance violated 
the Establishment clause of the First Amendment—-a very 
significant issue in our current cultural polarization.  
92 While the Newdow situation preceded Cheney, the public 
scrutiny of the duck-hunt was much more controversial and is the 
primary reason this Comment stresses Cheney as causing the 
Supreme Court’s luck to run out.    
93 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915-16 
(2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.) (stating that the duck hunting trip 
was planned long before the Court granted cert. to hear Cheney).   
94 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 124 S. Ct. 
2576, 2582 (2004) (explaining that the energy group was directed 
to develop a national energy policy that would promote 
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“dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound” energy for 
the future).  
95 The Sierra Club, http://www.sierraclub.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2006) (stating that “[t]he Club is America's oldest, 
largest and most influential grassroots environmental 
organization.”—-which conveys a logical reason for their concern 
with America’s energy policy).   
The most outspoken respondent was the Sierra Club. 
96 Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2583 (explaining that the complaint 
filed by the Sierra Club alleges that non-federal employees 
participated in the non-public NEPDG meetings, which would mean 
that FACA would apply—-subjecting the group to a variety of 
open-meeting and disclosure requirements that were never met; 
therefore, the energy group should not benefit from the Act’s 
exemption of public disclosure requirements).   
97 Id. at 2953 (stating that the Circuit Court 
misinterpreted United States v. Nixon and terminated its inquiry 
into whether a writ of mandamus would be appropriate in a 
situation where an overly broad discovery order by the District 
Court could impair the executive branches performance of its 
constitutional duties—-raising separation of powers issues).  
98 Dana Mulhauser, Half Court, The New Republic Online, June
25, 2004, 
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http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=express&s=mulhauser062504
(discussing the impact Justice Scalia’s refusal to recuse 
himself may have had in the high court’s finding of law).  
99 See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Scalia’s Trip With Cheney 
Raises Questions of Impartiality, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2004, at 
A14 (stating that as a result of Mr. Cheney’s trip with Justice 
Scalia, Democrats in Congress and legal ethics experts believe 
that Justice Scalia should recuse himself from hearing the case 
where Mr. Cheney is the defendant—-explaining the validity of 
his energy task force); Charles Lane, High Court Questioned On 
Allowing Scalia Trip, Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 2004, at A4 
(commenting on the fact that Scalia traveled with Cheney to duck 
hunt after the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case involving 
Cheney’s energy task force and that the Justice stated that 
people could not reasonably question his impartiality based on 
the trip); Dana Milbank, Scalia Joined Cheney on Flight; 
Justice’s Ride on Air Force Two Adds New Element to Conflict 
Issue, Wash. Post, Feb 6, 2004, at A4 (“Bill Allison of the 
Center for Public Integrity said that taxpayers would cover the 
cost of flying Scalia, standard procedure for Air Force Two 
passengers, but that the invitation from Cheney could add to 
appearances of a conflict of interest. ‘It does raise the level 
of closeness a little bit higher,’ Allison said. ‘It makes it 
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seem more like Cheney was courting Scalia.’); David G. Savage, 
Trip With Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia; Friends hunt 
ducks together, even as the justice is set to hear the vice 
president’s case, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 2004, at A1 (explaining 
that even though Scalia and Cheney are longtime friends and avid 
hunters, several legal ethics scholars question whether the 
timing of their trip may raise doubts about whether Scalia can 
decide the case impartially).  
100 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) 
(mem.) (Scalia, J.) (“The organization moved for the recusal of 
a United States Supreme Court Justice.”).  
101 Id.
102 See Id. at 915 (stating that the trip was set long 
before cert. was granted; the men never slept in the same room, 
hunted in the same blinds, or ate in separate quarters). But see
Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and 
the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 107, 118-19 (2004) (“[W]e must take him at his word that he 
and Cheney did not speak about the pending matter. This trust us 
rationale, as it applies to (not) discussing the issues of the 
case while publicly displaying friendship during the case’s 
pendency, inherently risks ignoring the reality of friendship 
and undervaluing public perception.”).   
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103 See discussion infra Part D(i).  
104 Cheney, 541 U.S. at 922. See also Roberts, supra note 
102, at 120 (“Instead of relying purely on the hypothetical 
objective person to show that the Justice’s impartiality was 
reasonably in question, the Sierra Club supplied a plethora of 
news accounts raising impartiality questions based on Justice 
Scalia’s actions.”).   
105 Cheney, 541 U.S. at 928-29.  
106 Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia’s 
Memorandum in the Cheney Case, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 229, 234 
(2004).  
107 Id.
108 See Cheney, 541 U.S at 916 (“[F]rom the earliest days 
down to modern times Justices have had close personal 
relationships with the President and other officers of the 
Executive.”).  
109 See generally Flamm, supra note 13, § 5.63, at 159 
(“[A]s a practical matter, because the challenged judge will 
usually decide the disqualification motion himself . . . . [T]he 
challenged judge’s subjective view as to what a reasonable 
person would believe is, in many instances, dispositive.”).   
110 See Dahlia Lithwick, Je Refuse!, Slate, Mar. 18, 2004, 
http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2097350
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(“[F]or all of Scalia’s intellectual force, rhetorical genius, 
and passion, this memorandum will not silence his critics . . . 
. [W]e also all now demand transparency, ideological litmus 
tests, and full disclosure. We have lost faith in judicial 
integrity, and Scalia’s call to trust me may be too late.”); see
also Roberts, supra note 102, at 118-19 (“Justice Scalia 
demonstrates his power for prose, as is often the case, but he 
dismisses the recusal motion primarily based on its form rather 
than the heart of the attack . . . . Self-declaration of one’s 
own impartiality does not answer the call of the question posed 
by the judicial recusal standards; rather, it is an unhelpful 
and unpersuasive tautology.”).   
111 See generally Bassett, supra note 79, at 703 (“Under the 
Supreme Court’s current recusal practices, a Justice’s decision 
not to participate in a case typically is not explained, leaving 
Court-watchers to guess the reason for a particular Justice’s 
non-participation.”).  
112 Hearing, supra note 53, at 3 (Statement of S. Feingold, 
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (explaining that Judge 
Roberts has been overly hesitant to discuss Hamdan).  
113 In both cases the executive officer was sued in his 
official capacity rather than on a personal level. This concept 
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is important to understand because the consequences of an 
unfavorable ruling in a personal capacity are much more severe.  
114 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (mem.) 
(Scalia, J.) (2004) (explaining that the appearance standard 
shall apply to the facts as they existed, not as others report 
them); Gillers, et al. supra note 52 (stating that the 
controversy lies in the public’s perception of a courtroom 
impropriety).   
115 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 124 S. Ct. 
2576 (2004) (“This Court has issued mandamus to, inter alia,
restrain a lower court whose actions would threaten the 
separation of powers by embarrassing the Executive Branch.”). 
116 The fact that Justice Scalia wrote a memorandum has no 
significance in applying his duck-hunting trip to the appearance 
standard—his trip still had the appearance of a personal 
relationship with a future litigant. However, the memorandum 
lays a foundation for change, which if applied properly could 
have prevented the duck-hunt debacle because the American public 
would lack reason to question the Justice’s intentions.    
117 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (mem.) 
(Scalia, J.) (2004) (“On the Supreme Court, however, the 
consequence is different: The Court proceeds with eight 
Justices, raising the possibility that, by reason of a tie vote, 
61 
 
it will find itself unable to resolve the significant legal 
issue presented by the case.”). 
118 28 U.S.C § 46(b) (2000).  
119 Sup. Ct. R. 4.
120 See Flamm, supra note 13, Addendum to Appendix A, at 
1068 (explaining that the important position the Supreme Court 
plays in American jurisprudence makes it inappropriate to be 
excessively cautious when a Justice faces a recusal situation). 
121 Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 
847, 859-60 (1988).  
122 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 9 
(2004).
123 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (mem.) 
(Scalia, J.) (2004) (stating that he recused himself in Newdow 
because of the appearance of impropriety standard, which the 
Sierra Club questioned him in Cheney).  
124 Suggestion for Recusal of Justice Scalia at 3, Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 03-7). 
125 See Id. at 3 (“Justice Scalia apparently indicated that 
the Ninth Circuit decision in the instant case was based on a 
flawed reading of the Establishment Clause. Yet it is highly 
unlikely that the Justice had ever read any of the briefs in the 
case.”). See also Jacueline L. Salmon, Scalia Defends Public 
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Expression of Faith; Recent Rulings Have Gone Too Far, Justice 
Says During Tribute to Va. Gathering, Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 2003, 
at B3 (“In a short speech . . . . Scalia criticized court 
decisions in recent years that have outlawed expressions of 
religious faith in public events. He cited as an example a 
California federal court ruling last summer that the words under 
God in the Pledge of Allegiance were a violation of the 
separation of church and state.”). 
126 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945 
(2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2003) 
(No. 02-1624). 
127 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4 
(2003). 
128 Id.
129 Recusal Motion, supra note 97, at 3.  
130 See Id. (“Under such circumstances – where he 
prematurely indicated that a lower court’s decision was wrong in 
a case he would likely hear – one might certainly reasonably 
question his impartiality.”).  
131 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 5. 
132 See Id. at 26-27 (“When hard questions of domestic 
relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is 
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for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to 
resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law.”). 
133 Id. at 22-23 (“Newdow’s standing derives entirely from 
his relationship with his daughter, but he lacks the right to 
litigate as her next friend . . . . [T]he interests of this 
parent [Michael Newdow] and this child are not parallel and, 
indeed, are potentially in conflict.”).  
134 Id. at 27 (stating that a California order giving 
exclusive legal rights of the child to the mother prohibits 
“[Michael Newdow’s] claimed right to shield his daughter from 
influences [reciting the Pledge of Allegiance] to which she is 
exposed.”).  
135 Roberts, supra note 102, at 125 (“The lack of any 
reasoned elaboration from Justice Scalia regarding his decision 
to recuse in Newdow leaves the public with a limited 
understanding of the basis for recusal in the first place.”). 
136 See Bloom, supra note 5, at 696-97 (“Prejudgment of the 
legal merits of the case is the easiest situation to resolve. 
When the prejudgment involves the application of law to specific 
facts in a particular case, disqualification is appropriate. 
“Unlike the development by judges of consistent views on legal 
principles, prior formulation or expression of opinion on the 
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merits of a pending case is not an activity which the public 
expects of judges or has reason to encourage.”).  
137 See generally Memorandum from Ronald D. Rotunda, 
Professor, George Mason University, to Arlen Specter, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 8 (Aug. 22, 2005) (on file with 
Roberts hearings) (“When Roberts had a conversation with the 
Attorney General in early April of 2005 (before there was any 
opening on the Court), it is common knowledge that he was not 
the only judge being considered for possible elevation to the 
Supreme Court. Even the day before (and the morning of) the 
final announcement on July 19, news reports told us who they 
thought the nominee would be, and the various names that were 
published were hardly limited to Roberts.”). But see Tom Brune, 
Roberts meeting ‘illegal’, Nation, Aug. 18, 2005, 
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-
uscort184388315aug18,0,5829402.story (stating that as a result 
of the White House interviewing John G. Roberts for the Supreme 
Court position as he heard a challenge to the president’s 
military tribunals, three legal ethicists said the White House 
broke the law).  
138 See generally Roberts, supra note 102, at 168-71 
(explaining that recusal accompanied by a memorandum would help 
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create a body of knowledge that would provide guidance to the 
public, lawyers, and judges).   
139 While no scholars have directly argued that a 
memorandum-—similar to the one from Cheney--clarifying the legal 
reasoning for Judge Roberts decision to hear Hamdan would have 
cleared any appearance misconceptions, the polarized opinions in 
the legal community clearly support a conclusion that Hamdan
exploits the weaknesses of the appearance standard’s unclear 
application. See Gillers, et al., supra note 52 (stating that 
the timing of the interviews and the fact that President Bush 
personalized designated Hamdan an enemy combatant makes the 
Roberts’ situation applicable to the standard, which should have 
resulted in his recusal). But see Rotunda, supra note 90, at 13 
(stating that the Gillers’ standard is harsher than the actual 
standard set forth in § 455(a), and that Roberts did not need to 
recuse himself because there was never an appearance of 
impropriety).   
140 See Everson v. Board of Educ. Of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-
16 (1947) (“The "establishment of religion" clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid 
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another . . . . In the words of [Thomas] Jefferson, the clause 
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against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 
“a wall of separation between church and state.”).  
141 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 26.  
142 If the district court’s opinion prevailed, the Geneva 
Conventions would apply to the alleged terrorists, resulting in 
trial by court-martial rather than—-the due process lacking--
Military Commissions.  
143 Bravin, supra note 4, at A4 (“On July 15, when Judge 
Roberts met with President Bush for the job-clinching interview, 
he joined a ruling in favor of the defendants, who included Mr. 
Bush.”).  
144 See Gillers, et al. supra note 52 (“The problem is that 
if one side that very much wants to win a certain case can 
secretly approach the judge about a dream job while the case is 
still under active consideration, and especially if the judge 
shows interest in the job, the public’s trust in the judiciary 
(not to mention the opposing party’s) suffers because the public 
can never know how the approach may have affected the judge’s 
thinking.”). But see Rotunda, supra note 90, at 13 (“Judge 
Roberts did not apply for a job; he did not negotiate the terms 
of employment; he did not initiate a meeting; he was no 
suppliant; he simply accepted the invitation of the Attorney 
General to meet to discuss a possible Supreme Court vacancy.”).    
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145 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).  
146 See Roberts, supra note 102, at 123-24 (explaining that 
Justice Scalia’s comments at the rally raised serious doubts 
that he could decide the case impartially).    
147 See Rotunda, supra note 90, at 3-8 (explaining that 
Gillers incorrectly reads the vague § 455(a) catch all phrase, 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” which as a 
result, broadens the standard inappropriately, making its 
application to situations like Hamdan questionable.   
148 Roberts, supra note 102, at 123-24.  
149 See Gillers, et al., supra note 52 (“What is immediately 
at stake, however, is the appearance of justice in the Hamdan
case and the proper resolution of an important legal question 
about the limits on presidential power.”). 
150 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 22-
23 (2003).  
151 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that the 
foundation of American liberty is that our law ensures the 
maintenance of the separation of powers, “[w]ith all its 
defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no 
technique for long preserving free government except that the 
Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by 
68 
 
parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined 
to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not 
first, to give them up.”).   
152 See Frost, supra note 13, at 535 (“The solution I offer 
is to incorporate into recusal law the core tenets of 
adjudication identified fifty years ago by Legal Process 
theorists as essential to maintaining the judiciary’s 
legitimacy.”); Bassett, supra note 79, at 702-03 (“This article 
proposes that the Court encourage recusal motions from parties 
appearing before the Court . . . . An increase in the filing of 
recusal motions would increase the information available to the 
Court and to the public.”).  
153 Frost extracted five procedural components of 
adjudication from the myriad scholarship of Legal Process 
theorists, which are essential to legitimize the process. See
Id. at 556-57 (“These procedures are thus legitimating not only 
because they provide a theoretical justification for the 
exercise of judicial power in a democracy, but also because they 
serve to further the Framers’ intended role for the courts in 
our constitutional structure.”).  
154 Id. at 556.  
155 Id. at 555-56.  
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156 Flamm, supra note 13, § 26.3.4, at 748 (“[Section] 455 
is stated in terms of a self-enforcing obligation, and courts 
generally agree that §455 was intended to ensure that federal 
judges would disqualify themselves in appropriate circumstances 
without any action on the part of a party.”).  
157 See Frost, supra note 13, at 582 (“Accordingly, § 455 
should be amended to provide that the parties have a right to 
seek a judge’s recusal by motion filed within an appropriate 
amount of time after obtaining information that suggests that 
the judge could not be impartial or that his impartiality might 
“reasonably be questioned.”); see also Gina Holland, Scalia 
Won’t Step Aside from Cheney Legal Issue, Lansing St. J., Mar. 
19, 2004, at 5A (noting that “[T]here are no clear procedures 
for litigators who seek to disqualify Supreme Court Justices.”)  
158 Frost, supra note 13, at 583 (“The proposal discussed 
here takes this disclose requirement significantly further by 
requiring the judge to provide directly to litigants in pending 
cases any information that might be considered to have an impact 
on the judge’s partiality.”). 
159 Id. at 584 (“Providing for an impartial decisionmaker on 
the question of recusal serves both to prevent actual injustice 
and the appearance of injustice.”). See also Hawaii-Pac. Venture 
Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 437 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D. Haw. 1977) 
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(proposing that a situation could arise where a judge who faced 
recusal refers the motion to another judge to promote “public 
confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.”).  
160 Frost, supra note 13, at 588 (“The challenged judge is 
the most natural party to respond to a motion to disqualify. He 
will be familiar with the facts cited by the moving party and is 
best able to put those facts in context for the 
decisionmaker.”).  
161 Id. at 589.  
162 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) 
(mem.) (Scalia, J.) (explaining in great detail why recusal was 
inappropriate in light of the circumstances); see also Laird v. 
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J.) (stating that 
an explanation for recusal is appropriate in certain 
situations).    
163 Frost, supra note 13, at 582-90 (having to disclose any 
and all financial interests, personal relationships, prior 
knowledge of issues in a case; drafting a statement of innocence 
to refute the motion; and after the judge has gone through the 
aforementioned protocol, submitting a statement explaining the 
reasons why recusal was appropriate).   
164 See Flamm, supra note 13, § 1.10.5, at 25 (“Just as 
judges generally do not like to admit having committed legal 
71 
 
error, they are typically less than eager to acknowledge the 
existence of situations that may raise questions about their 
impartiality . . . . [I]t must be acknowledged that the filing 
of a judicial disqualification motion may antagonize the 
challenged judge either consciously or subconsciously.”); 
Bassett, supra note 79, at 672 (“[M]any judges respond to 
potential recusal situations with a defensive—sometimes 
arrogant—“I am not biased; I can be fair.””); Donald C. Nugent, 
Judicial Bias, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1994) (“[J]udges are 
typically appalled if their impartiality is called into 
question.”).    
165 Bassett, supra note 79, at 702.  
166 Id. at 703-05 (stating that the standard would encourage 
litigants to file recusal motions and draft “statements of 
interest” that “disclose[s] on the record information that [the] 
judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider 
relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge 
believes there is no real basis for disqualification.”).  
167 Id. at 704 (“[I]f Justices were consistently to 
acknowledge all potential interests in the litigation before 
them [through “statements of interest”], such acknowledgements 
might invigorate public confidence in the Court—while at the 
same time preserving the Court’s critical function.”).   
72 
 
168 Bassett provides no rationale of why self-enforcement is 
good or bad, but from her support of the status quo it appears 
that she believes the current standard is effective. But see
Bloom, supra note 5, at 697 (stating that transfer of a recusal 
motion to a different judge comports more closely to the 
objective standard of § 455(a) and could be more effective for 
preserving judicial integrity).   
169 Bassett, supra note 79, at 703 (stating that the new 
Statement of Recusal Policy should clarify the narrow approach 
so that a Justice only recuse when there is actual bias or an 
appearance of impropriety). Bassett’s “quick and dirty” approach 
leaves the reader guessing what the professor suggests would 
help elucidate the high courts already narrow policy.  
170 Id. at 704.  
171 See Id. at 704 (“[P]ermitting all of the Justices to 
participate in the vast majority of cases.”). 
 
172 Id. (“The institution of “statements of interest” would 
avoid fear by the public of unknown, unacknowledged 
relationships, interest, or biases that Justices might have in a 
particular case, and would serve a policing function for the 
Justices as well.”).  
173 Gillers, et al. supra note 52 (“[The] Senate questionare 
reveal[s] that Roberts had several interviews with 
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administration officials contemporaneous with the progress of 
the Hamdan appeal.”). 
174 See Hearing, supra note 53, at 2-3. 
175 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.  
176 See Nugent, supra note 164, at 3 (“Fundamental to the 
notion of a fair trial and tribunal is the principle that a 
judge shall apply the law impartially and free from the 
influence of any personal biases.”). See generally Leubsdorf, 
supra note 35, at 277 (suggesting how difficult it is for a 
judge to know for whether they are completely impartial, “[y]et 
even honest judges may be swayed by unacknowledged motives.”).    
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